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·' PEOPLE '\'. NOB WOODS 
Cite u 23a P.2d 8D7 
897 
81 CJa1.2d 584 : .i·. 
PEOPLE Y. NOR WOODS. 
Cr. 5~H.).· 
Supreme Court l'fCBilfornla. 
July 20. :1951. , 
:I:. " . 
Rebearlng Denled~ug.l6, 1951. . . 
WoOdrow Nor Woods 'Was' convicted in Su-
perior Court of San- Dlbgo--eouDty, Jobn A. 
Hewleker, J., ot grand t~ and be-appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Traynor. J., beld that· 
evidence sustained convi~tlon tor grand theft 
coJ;Ilmltted by mlsrepre.t1ng condition of 
title of automobile when',':I)e~ same. 
Judgment affirmed. I':.'; 
I. Fal._ pret_ •••• <8=>49(0 
,Evidence . sustained '.conviction for 
grand theft· committed, when defendant 
made misrepresentation !'to"-buyer of automo-
bile of condition of title.' Pen.Code, §§ 484, 
487. " 
2. Fal" pretenses ~26 . ": . 
Under statule prOvWng that incharg-
ing theft it shall be suffi~lent JO allege in in-
formation that defendal); 'unlawfully took 
labur or property of aqOther it was un-
necessary, in informatiOii'charging grand 
theft by seller's misrep~e~enting to buyer 
condition of title of au~oI>ile, to allege 
particular type of the~t: in)(olved. Pen. 
Code, § 952. : iii,' ,,' 
a. La ..... y <8=>14(1) 
Where defendant ~:lJsety represented 
condition of title of aUf6mobile to buyer 
and accepted purchase! price and finance 
company later !'epossess~(f aut~obHe from 
buyer, if defendant se\Ittintended that 
only possession of automobile should pass 
at time of sale, defencla/lt Was guilty of 
larceny by trick or device.' 
':'i. 
... Fal •• pret ••••• <8=>20 
, " Where defendant falsely represented 
condition of title of autoiliobile 10 buyer and 
a~epted purchase price! 'Alld . /inance com-
pany later repossessed! iiutomobHe from 
buyer, if defendant seHer. intended title 
should pass, defendant w". guilty of obtain-
ing property by false pretenses. Pen. Code, 
1952. i'i"',, 
.;' 
I. False prefens,. ~5a 
Larc •• y e=>70(1) 
Where defendant seller falsely repre-
sented to buyer condition or'title of auto-
mobile and accepted purchase price and 
!finance' company later repossessed. autom.o--
bile from buyer, defendant was guilty of 
theft by either larceny by Irick or device 
or by obtaining property by. faJse pretenses, 
depending upon whether defendant intended 
title or merely possession to pass, and it 
was not necessary that jury be instructed 
upon metlhod. by .. which tlheft was com-
mitted, since it was immaterial whether 
they agreed as to technical pigeonhole into 
which theft fell. 
6. Fal •• prot ..... C=54 
where defendant seller falsely repre-
sented to buyer of automobile that title 
was . in certain condition and seller ac-
cepted purchase price and another autom<>-
bile in trade-in, and dinance company later 
repossessed automobile from" buYer, al .. 
though defendant was guilty of either 
la.rceny by trick or device' or of obtaining 
property by false pretenses, depending up-
on whether he intended possession or title 
to pass at time 'of transaction, there was 
only one tlheft and imposing of two sen-
tences to run conCUtTently was error. Pen. 
Code, § 952. 
7. Criminal law :~I-I77 
Where two s'entc~nces were imposed 
for transaction which cOnstituted but on~ 
theft, fact that sentences were ordered t6 
run eoneurtently did not"cureerror. 
Woodrow Nor Woods, in pro. per .. 
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Gilbert 
Harelson and Frank Richards, Deputy 
Attys. Gen., for respondent. . 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
Defendant has appealed from an order 
denying his motion for a new trial and from 
the judgment of conviction on two counts 
of grand theft. 
Defendant, a used car dealer, offered to 
sell a 1949 Ford to the complaining wituess, 
Campouris, in exchange for. a 1946 Ford 
____________ , ... ;'lEa"''''''''~. _____________________ _ 
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and $1,183.14 in cash, Campouris accepted 
the offer and delivered his Car and a check 
for the money to defendant on· the latter's 
representation that the title to the 1949 
Ford was clear except for a $1,183.14 lien, 
which defendant promised to discharge with 
the cash payment. Defendant gave Camp-
ouris a biB of sale and in the place provided 
for liens wrote, uNo exceptions will del 
title as soon as from Sacramento, Cali· 
fornia. I, Campouris agreed to give de-
fendant the ownership certificate for the 
1946 Ford, when defendant gave him the 
certificate for the 1949 Ford At the time 
of the sale the ownership certificate of 
tlhe 1946 Ford was in the possession of the 
;Bank of America. The bank had made a 
loan OD the car that had been paid. De-
fendant sold the 1946 Ford In a third party 
who was able to secure the ownership 
certificate from the bank. Actually the 
lien on the 1949 Ford was greatly in ex-
cess of $1,183.14, and defendant did not 
use that mQIley or the money that he ob-
tained from the sale of the 1946 Ford to 
discharge it. Approximately a year after 
the sale In Campouris the !finance company 
repossessed the 1949 Ford Defendant 
has not retnmed to Campouris either the 
cash or the 1946 Ford 
[1] From the foregoing evidence the 
jury was justified in .finding that defend-
""t, by misrepresenting the condition of the 
title of the 1949 Ford, defrauded Campouris 
of the price he agreed to pay for that car 
and was guilty of grand theft. Penal Code, 
§§484,487. 
[2] Defendant contends that the in-
formation was defective in failing to speci-
fy the kind of grand theft with which he 
was charged Penal Code section 952 pro-
vides, however, that "In charging theft it 
shall be sufficient to allege that the de-
fendant unlawfully took the labor or pr0p-
erty of another." Accordingly, it was not 
Ilecessary for the information to allege 
the particular type of tlheft involved, such 
as false pretenses embezzlement, or larceny 
by trick and device. People v. Fewkes, 214 
Cal. 142, 149,4 P 2d 538. 
agree upon the method by which the theft 
was committed. If Campouris mtended that 
only possession of the property should pass 
at the time of the sale, defendant was guilty 
of larceny by trick or .device, but if Camp-
ouris intended that title should pass, de-
fendant was guilty of obtaining property 
by false pretenses .. People v. Delbas, 146 
Cal. 734, 736, 81 P. 131; People v. De 
Gra.ff, 127 Cal. 676, 679, 60 P. 429; People 
v. Fawver, 29 CaI.App.2d Supp. 775, 
777-779, 77 P.2d 325, and cases cited. Ir-
respective of Campouris's intent, however, 
defendant could be found guilty of tlheft 
by ODe means or another, and since by the 
verdict the jury determined that he did 
fraudulently appropriate the property, it is 
immaterial whether or not they agreed as 
to the technical pigeonhole into which the 
theft fell. People v. Jones, 61 C.I.App2d 
608, 622-623, 143 P.2d 726; People v. Cald-
well, 55 Cal.App.2d 238, 256, 130 P.2d 495. 
[6, 7J Defendant contends that at most 
he was guilty of the commission of one 
offense. We agree with this contention. 
It is unnecessary to determine under what 
circumstances the taking of different prop-
erty from the same person at different times 
may constitute ODe or more thefts. See, 
People v. Howes, 99 Cal.App.2d 808, 
81~21, 222 P 2d 969, and cases cited. 
In the present case both the car and the 
money were taken at the same time as 
part of a single transactioo whereby de-
fendant defrauded Campouri. of the pur-
chase price of the 1949 Ford. There was, 
accordingly, only ooe theft, and the fact 
that the sentences were ordered to Tun 
concurrently does not cure the error. See, 
People v. Kehoe, 33 CaL2d 711, 715, 716, 
204 P.2d 321; cf., People v. Slobodion, 31 
Cal.2d 555, 562, 191 P 2d 1. 
In the light of the record, defendant's 
cootentioos that the trial was improperly 
conducted, that his attorney concealed hi. 
innocence, and that- the case against him 
was a conspiracy cannot be 9l1stained. By 
returning a verdict of guilty the jury re-
jected defendant's version of the trans-
actions, and its determination is binding on 
appeal. 
[3-5J Similarly, there was no error in The order denying the motion for a new 
failing In instruct the jury that they must trial is affirmed. The judgment i. reversed 
DSSLOrr .... PEAltSON ' 899 
Cite as 283 P.2d 899 
insofar as it adjudges defendant guilty on 2. Declaratory ,udgme.t 08=145 
the second count of gralld theft. In all Where employee alleged in complaint 
other respects the judgment is affirmed. that he was to receive salary and 10% of net 
profits as compensation and that employers 
,GIBSON, c.' J;, anti SHENK, ED- improperly computed net profits, and em-
MONDS, and CARTER, n.,; :concur. ployers answered that their method of com-
putation of net profit. was proper and filed 




o I m _11M" S'mIM 
T 
'i- I,.' 
KESSLOFF Y. PEARSON et al. 
'L A. 21918. 
Supreme Conrt ofC.ltlo~1a, In Bank. 
Ju17 27,l951. 
BehearlDg Denled 'Aug. 23, 1951. 
Alex Kesslolf brought .. elton against Ed· 
Ward F. Pearson, and others, for declaratory 
reUef and an aecountlng" alleging employ. 
,ment contract whereby,pIalntllf was to re-
<elve sallll'7 and perceQtAre of net profits 
earned by defendants' ,CQDlpany. Defendants 
11100 Cl'OSIH!Omplalnt fO~ J;eformatlon of the 
contract. The Superior Court, Los Angeles 
'Oouuty, David Colemab, :;1., entered Judg· 
ment dlamlsslng action i\il' gmund that com· 
plaint did not state caWie of action for de-
'claratory reller, ond plalntllf appealed. The 
Supreme Coort, SbeDk,:~,J'~,I i held that com-
plaint .tated cause of a~on for an account-
ing, and dismissal of :~",plalnt Waa 1m. 
proper. 
l!eversed. 
PrIor opiniOn, 226 P.2d~t., 
I~ Declaratory JudDment"~8 
Under statutes pro'iiiding for declara-
tory judgment as to mu!,,;i! rights and obli-
gations of persons under: it, contract in ad-
vance of breach, and p~\.iding that court 
can refuse to exereise :iin'kh power where 
it -is unnecessary Or un~Per at the time 
under all the cireumstaheJ., discretion' in 
refu9ing to exercise poWer !~s not unlimited 
but is a legal or judicial discretion subject 
to appellate review, and: d~claratory relief 
must be granted when the' fa<:ts in the case 
justifying that course are" sufficiently al-
leged. Code Civ.Proc. U; 1060, 1061. 
. that contract did Dot show true intention 
of parties as to how percentage compensa-
tion was to be computed, an actual con-
troversy as tQ terms and construction of 
contract was' presented within statute pro-
viding for declaratory relief. Code Civ. 
Proc. § 1060. 
3. Declaratory Judgment 08=362 
Where employee broUght action for de-
claratory Telief and an aocounting, alleging 
contract whereby employee was to receive 
salary and percentage of net profits, and 
that employers improperly computed net 
profit. in arriving at actual amounts due 
to 'employee, breach of contract was al-
legedon which a<:tion for accounting could 
be based and wherein questions as to terms 
and construction of contract would become 
triable issues, and therefore, dismissal of 
action On ground of insufficiency of com· 
plaint was improper. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 
1060 to 100Za. 
... Trial 08=13(3) 
Where employee brought action for 
declaratory judgment and an accounting, 
alleging contract whereby employee was to 
receive salary and percentage of net profits, 
if it should appear that employee mistitled 
adion a& in decla'tatory relief for Sbte pur-
pose of obtaining preference on calendar, 
trial court would have power to prevent 
accomplishment of that purpose by appro-
priate order or procedure. Code Civ.Proc. 
§§ 1060 to 1062 .. 
,Aaron Sapiro and Hyman O. Danoff, 
Los Angeles, for appellant. 
Louis Licht, Mitchell, Silberberg & 
Knupp and Arthur Groman, aU of Los An_ 
geles, for respondent. 
